UN Peacekeeping in Lebanon: Global and Regional Challenges
From Lebanon Expats/ Moghtarebee Lubnan
Viewpoints
• Source: FPA Features
• Author: Marco Vicenzino
July 27th, 2006
Instead of discouraging the international community from contributing to a multinational force, the attack that claimed four UN soldiers on July 26 th underscores the importance and fundamental need to insert such a force as soon as possible to prevent further atrocities.
A strong multinational force for Lebanon must be backed by a strong UNSC mandate with clear and assertive terms and conditions and a key provision for the “use of any necessary means” to implement the mandate and those previously existing, specifically UNSC Resolution 1559. The mission should be composed of approximately 10,000 to 15,000 troops and a paramilitary police force (gendarmes) of 1,500 to 2,000, responsible for conducting searches, arrests and detentions. The military force should consist of large size brigades, perhaps from South Asian countries such as India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, and smaller special forces units from European countries. The multinational force would also include a civilian staff of 400 to 500 persons in charge of critical functions, including engineers, language specialists, translators, officers responsible for political affairs, human rights, logistics and communications and support staff. The mission’s total annual cost would range between $400-500 million.
Success can only be guaranteed if the Security Council’s permanent five (P5) members (U.S., Russia, China, France and UK) and the wider international community become direct and primary stakeholders in the operation together with full and complete involvement, participation and coordination with the Lebanese central government, parliament, judiciary, national army, law enforcement authorities and civil society.
With a full vested interest in the mission, the P5 would provide credibility to the process and operation and essential guidance and resources. In such a volatile environment, leadership cannot be outsourced to smaller states which would be simply be devoured by the intricacies of local power and politics. Furthermore, with a P5 presence and involvement, those most inclined to conflict will be extremely reluctant to interfere or present problems. A strategy must be devised for long-term engagement, unlike recent missions in East Timor which was once thought to be the ideal peacekeeping operation after just two years, only to collapse in a few days of political turmoil.
In addition, seizing the initiative to oversee the creation and implementation of an effective multinational force for Lebanon may provide Secretary General Kofi Annan with the opportunity to conclude his stewardship at the United Nations, which ends this year, on a very high note.
With a robust international presence, accompanied by the global spotlight and international public opinion, Lebanon ‘s political class would be called to order and pressured to break any political impasse and implement desperately needed reform. In addition, the presence of multinational forces would provide significant economic opportunities for distressed local communities.
Although Iran backs Hizbullah and China and Russia maintain close relations with Iran due to its geopolitical and strategic importance as a source of energy, the Security Council duo is unlikely to assume the regular role of opposition to the U.S.-UK-France trio in questions of intervention, national sovereignty and interference in the domestic affairs of states. Lebanon is simply economically insignificant in global trade and commerce but politically important in a regional context. Although support may not be fully unequivocal, cooperation from Russia and China can be expected for a mission in Lebanon, particularly when considering that such a high-profile and symbolically important operation would require only limited investment in exchange for value-added political capital, an improved diplomatic image, increased influence and greater presence in a strategically critical and volatile part of the world.
By internationalizing the plight of Lebanon and involving the world’s major powers and wider international community, Iran and Syria will be pressured to cooperate. Attempting to derail the process would risk both countries further international alienation and diplomatic isolation. Considering how much they have invested in acquiring influence in Lebanon in recent decades, there is simply too much at stake to risk being sidelined. Therefore, cooperation and not confrontation would be the best policy for Iran and Syria to pursue throughout any reconstruction process and beyond, provided the international community remains engaged.
In conclusion, the longer the current crisis continues, the higher is the risk that events may descend into a vicious downward cycle and develop an unpredictable, irrational and independent dynamic beyond the control of the active participants and beyond the most sensible expectations of all concerned parties.
Regional and International Factors
The crisis continues to demonstrate how unresolved regional disputes in the Middle East will constantly resurface, the potential for regional conflict remains real, and underscores the fundamental need for a comprehensive settlement not only between Israel and Lebanon, but with the Palestinians and other regional neighbors with which Israel has outstanding disputes, specifically Syria. Although the current conflict is clearly intertwined in the wider complexities of regional geopolitics, its immediate impact is on local populations caught in the crossfire, usually the innocent bystanders aspiring to an ordinary life free of violence. In the case of Lebanon, it is of a people struggling for normality and stability after decades of turbulence.
Although few may disagree with the claim by Ehud Olmert at the beginning of the crisis that the “rules of the game have changed”, there may be disagreement as to how these have changed and what are the new rules, if any.
Just as the U.S. and Soviet Union pursued their rivalry through proxy wars in third country, Lebanon is once again being used as a battleground for regional powers to play out their competing interests. Although present since the 1970s, Syria’s full and complete control of most of Lebanon materialized from 1990 to 2005. Although arguably a stabilizing factor at first, it later proved an obstacle to Lebanon’s political development through the skillful exploitation of sectarian differences to divide and rule Lebanon through manipulation, intimidation, fear and, when necessary, force.
Since the birth of Israel in 1948, the Israeli/Palestinian issue has had an enormous spillover effect on Lebanon ‘s internal politics, tipping the fragile balance of sectarian power into civil war in 1975 and leading to successive Israeli interventions since then. After the 1979 Revolution, Iran adeptly exploited the status of its Shiite brethren in Lebanon to assist in the emergence of Hizbullah and gain a foothold in the Levant to acquire influence and spread the ideals of its revolution.
United States policy, involvement and interest in Lebanon ranging from the 1950s under Eisenhower to Reagan in the 1980’s has often proved temporary and short-lived based more upon immediate short-term concerns and needs and rarely ever on a calculated long-term vision. Ultimately, the intricacies of Lebanese politics have discouraged excessive involvement on the part of: (i) a goals-oriented foreign policy establishment struggling to grasp the complexities and unpredictable twists of Lebanese political culture; and (ii) a political class hungry for quick successful outcomes to sell to an electorate with a very short-term interest span and often susceptible to sound-bites.
The obsession with “getting right” in foreign policy simply cannot be applied to Lebanon in the short-term. Lebanon is still an historical experiment in the making and evolving with each generation. Patience is required and considering its size (but without realizing its uniqueness and appreciating its potential) it may not attract the necessary long-term U.S. attention, particularly in light of other foreign commitments.
Within the grand scope of U.S. foreign policy, there is a historical tendency to reduce Lebanon to a geopolitical footnote, only to be re-visited in times of crisis. In part, this may explain America’s close alliance with Israel since it is perceived as a more understandable state in a complex and strategically important environment and consequently more reliable in providing favorable results, particularly in times of crisis.
With the U.S. firmly backing Israel, as evidenced by the international conference in Rome, and Iran and Syria supporting Hizbullah, the European Union may be in a unique position and possess an historical opportunity to seize the diplomatic initiative as a regional power-broker and increase its role, credibility and presence in the Middle East. It would be an exaggeration to view this as an attempt at historical redemption for the Sykes-Picot treaty of 1916, a secret understanding between Britain and France carving up much of the region into spheres of influence, which many Arabs view as Western betrayal and the root of the region’s present problems after Ottoman rule.
Since de-colonization, France has desired to continue playing the rhetorical role of “concerned former master” of Lebanon only to find its influence fading over the years. However, through the European Union, it can continue playing an important role in Lebanon, but only within the context of coordinating and collaborating with the U.S. when possible. This was clearly demonstrated in the approval of UNSC 1559, demanding Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon and the disarming of Hizbullah and other armed groups in Lebanon. Furthermore, recent calls for a European-led stabilization in mission could also present a new dynamic for the EU, particularly if Turkey (another former colonial master of contemporary Lebanese territory) participates in a significant manner. In addition, the fact that the first international meeting on the recent crisis was held in Rome (though failing to achieve a cease-fire) may reflect this diplomatic evolution. Furthermore, economic incentives by the EU, such as market access and trade preferences, for Lebanon can have a significant impact. Ultimately, with the U.S. engaged in numerous global commitments, principally Iraq, the time is ripe for more active EU engagement in the region.
Regional Divisions
The recent crisis in Lebanon has also further exposed the historical but deteriorating Sunni-Shia rift which is increasingly playing itself out in Lebanon and throughout the region, particularly through the political leaderships in competing states, and principally in Iraq, but also beyond. Many of the region’s Sunni-led states condemned Hizbullah’s July 12 th raid on Israel’s northern border which triggered the current crisis, while the Shiite-led states and organizations expressed support for Hizbullah. However, among ordinary people throughout the Arab and wider Muslim world, Nasrallah is revered as a hero and resister against the common “Zionist enemy”, at least for the time being and during the conflict.
As the greatest threat to Saudi Arabia’s national security and influence in the Middle East, Iran and its long-time support for Hizbullah is matched by Saudi support for the current government and the Hariri faction, of which the current Prime Minister is part of. While the UN has called for an aid package of $150m for 800,000 over the next 3 months and the U.S. has offered $30m for immediate aid, and Saudi Arabia has begun with a pledge of $1billion. As different camps continue to compete for influence in Lebanon, Iranian funds for Hizbullah and reconstruction will not be lacking and Syrian willingness to act as a reliable and indispensable conduit in order to exert its own influence, though with limited economic means, will not be in short supply.
The prospects for Lebanon’s political future may have more wide-ranging and far-reaching implications for regional transformation over time than policy-makers may realize, or may care to admit. The failure or inability to appreciate this may again result in a vicious cyclical turn of events.
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